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UNITED STATES REPORT
by Phillip I. Blumberg*
INTRODUCTION
This paper reviews the American experience with respect to the
rights of workers affected by such major employment developments as
bankruptcy, sale or merger, enterprise or plant closings, relocations and
mass layoffs. The labor movement in the United States has made only
limited progress toward protecting workers and their employment
rights in the event of such major developments in the workplace. Re-
garding solvency concerns, employee protection-where it exists at
all-is found almost entirely in union representation and union collec-
tive bargaining agreements rather than in statutory or administrative
regulation. Even in these limited cases, protection is spotty. First, only
a minority of collective agreements restrict employer discretion in these
areas. Second, the labor relations laws impose no general restriction on
employer decision-making in such matters; and the laws only require
that in cases where a union has been designated as the bargaining rep-
resentative,' employers bargain over the effects of such decisions on
employees.2
* Professor of Law and Business, University of Connecticut School of Law. Dean, University of
Connecticut School of Law, 1974 to 1984. A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Harvard Law School.
I. The National Labor Relations Act [NLRA] sets forth the procedure for designation of a
union as the exclusive bargaining representative of workers in a particular bargaining unit. This
requires designation by a majority of the workforce or in a supervised representation election. 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
2. The NLRA requires an employer to bargain with the union certified as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of employees in a designated bargaining unit over "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (1982). Such matters constitute
mandatory subjects of bargaining. Other matters pertaining to the employment relationship, not in
violation of statutory policy, may be included in collective agreements by the employer and the
union; these are permissive subjects of bargaining. Matters in violation of statutory policy are
illegal subjects of bargaining. See I A.B.A. SEC. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, THE DEVELOP-
ING LABOR LAW ch. 18 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].
The determination of the scope of managerial discretion included within the statutory defini-
tion of mandatory subjects of bargaining is the crucial question with respect to sale or merger,
plant closings, or relocation.
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In the absence of restrictions in isolated collective bargaining
agreements or under the labor relations laws, employers are to a large
extent free to make decisions without labor approval or even consulta-
tion. In the absence of a recognized union, employer freedom in this
area is unrestricted, except in the case of certain regulated industries,
primarily transportation, which for decades have been the subject of
extensive federal legislation that includes labor matters.'
In addition to the labor relations laws, other American statutes
provide limited protection for workers in their employment relation-
ships. In the case of insolvency, the bankruptcy laws contain special
recognition of workers' interests in the liquidation or reorganization of
a bankrupt concern. Similarly, the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act (ERISA) contains extensive provisions for the protection of
workers' and retirees' rights under employer-pension plans.
I. INSOLVENCY
A. The Bankruptcy Code
The Bankruptcy Code (the Code)" provides for the filing of volun-
tary and involuntary petitions in bankruptcy against any debtor by
three or more creditors. Voluntary petitions must be filed in "good
faith" but require no proof of insolvency.' In the case of involuntary
petitions, relief requires proof that "the debtor is generally not paying
The Railway Labor Act imposes a separate, and somewhat different, framework for collective
bargaining and labor disputes between rail and air carriers and their employees. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-
160, 181 (1982).
3. The Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933 was one of the earliest statutes pro-
tecting railroad workers against dismissal. Emergency Railroad Transportation Act ch. 91, 48
Stat. 211 (1933). Subsequent rail transportation statutes continued such protection of worker pay
and jobs in the event of change of ownership. These include the Regional Rail Reorganization
Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 701, 797 (1982); the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501,
546(b), 565, 648 (1982); and the Transportation Act of 1940 ch. 722, 54 Stat. 898 (1940). In the
administration of the Federal Aviation Act, the Civil Aeronautics Board required protection of
employees as a condition for approval of mergers and route changes, including severance pay and
displacement allowances. Rosenfeld, Airline Mergers: The Public Interest in Labor Protective
Provisions, 61 Ky. L.J. 429, 435 (1973). Similarly, the Communications Act of 1943 provides
severance pay for persons discharged or laid off as the result of merger of telegram (but not
telephone) carriers. 47 U.S.C. § 222(f) (1962).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. III 1985).
5. See In re Victory Constr., Inc., 3 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 655 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981)
(construing II U.S.C. § 301 (1982).; 2 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 301 (15th ed. 1987) [herein-
after COLLIER]. Voluntary filings have occurred in the case of debtors facing potential major tort
product liability, such as Johns-Mansville Co. (asbestos) and A.H. Robbins Co. (Dalkon Shield).
This paper is not concerned with such voluntary petitions.
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such debtor's debts as such debts become due .. -6 Proceedings may
involve the liquidation of a debtor and distribution of its assets to credi-
tors (Chapter 7) or the reorganization of the debtor for continuing op-
erations (Chapter 11).
The areas of greatest concern to workers of a bankrupt employer
arise under the provisions of § 507(a) of the Code dealing with priori-
ties of creditor claims, including wage and pension claims, and of § 365
(as affected by § 1113) of the Code dealing with the rejection of execu-
tory contracts, including collective-bargaining agreements.
In recent years, the treatment of collective-bargaining agreements
in employer bankruptcy proceedings has become one'of the most con-
troversial areas in American labor law.7
6. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (1982). This is the so-called "equity"-test of insolvency used by
Anglo-American equity jurisprudence for many years. The predecessor bankruptcy statute em-
ployed the so-called "bankruptcy" or balance-sheet test of insolvency, requiring an excess of liabil-
ities over assets. II U.S.C. 8 1(19) (1976) (repealed by Bankruptcy Act of 1978 ch. I, § 101(26),
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 5811). The substitution of the equity insolvency test for the bankruptcy test
for this purpose was a change of great significance. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 323, 324 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1978).
The "bankruptcy" test still survives for other purposes of the Code, including fraudulent
transfers. See II U.S.C. §§ 101(31), 548(a) (Supp. III 1985). "Insolvency" occurs when the sum
of an entity's "debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation" II U.S.C. §
101(31) (Supp. Iii 1985). "Fair valuation has been construed to mean fair market value, or the
value that may be realized in a reasonable period of time by a willing seller, rather than a forced
sale or book value. See P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS IN THE
BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING THE
LAW OF CORPORATE GUARANTIES § 7.06 (1985); McCoid, The Occasion for Involuntary Bank-
ruptcy, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195 (1987).
7. The discussion in the legal literature is extensive. See. e.g.. T. HAGGARD & M. PULLIAM,
CONFLICTS BETWEEN LABOR LEGISLATION AND BANKRUPTCY LAW (1987) [hereinafter HAG-
GARD & PULLIAM]; M. Cook & S. Block-Lieb, Collective Bargaining Agreements under the
Bankruptcy Code, in I CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION 1988,
446 P.LI. COMM. 703 (1988); Bendixsen, Enforcing the Duty to Arbitrate Claims Arising under a
Collective Bargain Agreement Rejected in Bankruptcy: Preserving the Parties' Bargain and Na-
tional Labor Policy, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 401 (1986); Hulser, The Rejection of Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: The Need for Informed Judicial Decisions, 134
U. PA. L. REV. 1235 (1986); Vian, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements Since the
1984 Amendments: The Case Law under the New Bankruptcy Code § 1113, 91 COM. L.J. 252
(1986); Berman, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements under the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments of 1984, 71 VA. L. REV. 983 (1985); Note, Bankruptcy Law - Bankruptcy Code § 1113:
The Standard for Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter II Debtors, 60
TEMPLE L.Q. 757 (1987); Note, Bankruptcy and the Union's Bargain: Equitable Treatment of
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1015 (1987); Comment, From Legislation to
Consternation: Has § 1113 Really Changed Bildesco, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 167 (1987).
1989]
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1. Priorities: The Statutory Structure
In liquidation cases and, with limited exceptions, in reorganization
cases,' the Code provides for seven priorities in the allocation of assets
available for the payment of unsecured claims for all purposes; the fol-
lowing priorities are particularly noteworthy:
The first priority concerns administrative expenses or the "actual,
necessary costs ... of preserving the estate," including "wages . . . for
services rendered after the commencement of the case." Such expenses
as workers' wages and pension contributions 9 for periods after the filing
of the petition are included within this section.
The third priority relates to "wages . . . including vacation, sever-
ance and sick leave pay" earned in the 90 days prior to the commence-
ment of the case (or the cessation of the debtor's business, if earlier) up
to a maximum of $2,000 per individual.
The fourth priority is for claims "for contributions to employee
benefit plans" arising from services rendered in the 180 days prior to
the commencement of the case (or the cessation of the debtor's busi-
ness, if earlier) to the extent of $2,000 per person covered by the plan,
less the aggregate amount paid to such persons under the third priority,
plus the amount paid by the debtor's estate for the benefit of such em-
ployees under any other benefit plan.
Such priorities control the distribution of assets in liquidation or
the terms of the reorganization plan. A plan may not be approved un-
less, among other things, each claimant receives consideration with a
present value at least equal to the amount the claimant would receive
in liquidation under Chapter 7V1
In the typical case, where net assets available for distribution or
allocation to unsecured creditors are insufficient for payment-in-full of
all unsecured claims, the statutory priorities effectively determine
which claims will be paid. Accordingly, they play an important role.
2. Priorities: Worker Claims in Bankruptcy
Complex issues arise in bankruptcy with respect to the status of
worker benefits other than wages; these include such matters as sever-
8. 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1982). See 3 COLLIER, supra note 5, at § 507.
9. See HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 7; G. Gerstell & E. Mackiewicz, Pensions and
Welfare Benefits in Bankruptcy 1988, 44 P.L.I. COMM. 7-241 [hereinafter PENSION AND WELFARE
BENEFITS); Novikoff & Polebaum, Pension-Related Claims in Bankruptcy Code Cases, 40 Bus.
LAw 373 (1985) [hereinafter Novikoff & Polebaum].
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1982).
(Vol. 5:7
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ance pay, employee benefit-fund payments, and pension-contribution
liability.1"
a. Wages, Vacation, Severance, and Sick-Leave Pay
The Code expressly provides that "wages" include not merely
wages, but also "vacation, severance, and sick leave pay."' 2 Hence,
claims for such items arising prior to the commencement of bankruptcy
proceedings qualify for the third bankruptcy priority accorded to
"wages." '1 3 However, questions ensue when such payments are made by
the debtor or the trustee after the commencement of the proceedings.
Such a situation is presented when severance pay is distributed by a
trustee after the commencement of the proceedings and based on the
length of employment including pre-bankruptcy service. All courts
agree that the relatively small portion accrued after the commencement
of the proceedings constitutes either an administrative expense entitled
to first statutory priority, or "wages" entitled to third statutory
priority."
b. Employee-Benefit-Plan Payments
Such payments expressly qualify for the fourth statutory priority,
which includes all claims for pre-petition payments and for post-peti-
tion payments related to pre-petition events. However, where required
as part of continued performance under continuing collective-bargain-
ing agreement, employee-benefit-fund payments after bankruptcy have
been held to be administrative expenses entitled to the first statutory
priority; this view persists even where such payments are measured by
3e AGA r ULLIAM, .SUPu nut 7, at229-45j, P'IONsi AND WE rLFAKE DENIIT
supra note 9; Novikoff & Polebaum, supra note 9.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1982). "Wages" priority includes claims for unpaid employer So-
cial Security taxes on "wages" qualifying for the priority. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 357, 358 (1977).
13. See In re Northwest Eng'g Co., 863 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1988) (vacation pay "earned" in
the 90 days prior to the petition filing date so long as right to receive such amount has vested).
14. Compare In re Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 713 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Health
Maintenance Fund. v. System Bd. Adjustment 94 Bhd. Ry., Airline, S.S. Clerks, 680 F.2d 619
(9th Cir. 1982); In re Pub. Ledger, 161 F.2d 762, 771 (3rd Cir. 1947) (denying administration
expense priority) with In re W.T. Grant Co., 620 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
983 (1980); Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v. Local 3 Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Wkrs., 386 F.2d 649 (2d
Cir. 1967) (allowing administrative expense priority). Thus, in Mammoth Mart, the court held
that where the severance pay is determined by length of service, any portion attributable to service
prior to filing is not entitled to first priority. In re Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d 950, 955
(1976).
1989]
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pre-bankruptcy hours of service, so long as not related to length of
service."
c. Pension-Fund Liability
Pension-fund contribution liability presents by far the most com-
plex problems. Almost all American workers and their benefits are cov-
ered by the federal pension program known as Social Security.' Al-
though financed by payroll taxes imposed on employers and employees,
this is a governmental program and is substantially unaffected by the
insolvency of an employer.
In addition, there are non-governmental pension programs. Some
are programs unilaterally adopted by employers; others are established
and maintained as a result of collective bargaining between employers
and unions. In 1984, there were approximately 47.5 million employees
or approximately 42 percent of the workforce participating in non-gov-
ernmental pension programs. Approximately 67 million employees or
60 percent of the workforce were participants in non-governmental
health insurance plans. 7
In addition to the contractual pension obligations arising under a
collective-bargaining agreement or a non-governmental pension plan,
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 8 imposes
numerous statutory obligations intended to assure adequate funding of
such plans.' 9 The three principal types of ERISA obligations present-
ing problems under the Bankruptcy Code relate to contribution liabil-
ity, withdrawal liability and termination liability.
In all, there are six categories of pension claims and pension
claimants - depending upon the nature of the claim, the party with
15. In re Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 713 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1983).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
17. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table No. 686 (1987).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. (1982).
19. ERISA is a particularly complex statute, and any comprehensive explanation is beyond
the scope of this paper. In summary, ERISA divides employer pension liabilities into three groups:
a pension plan relating only to one employer (termed "single employer plan"); a pension plan
embracing several employers but not arising under collective bargaining agreements (termed a
"multiple employer plan"); and a pension plan embracing several employers arising under a col-
lective bargaining agreement (confusingly termed a "multi-employer plan"). Statutory liability
varies sharply depending on the nature of the plan. Statutory contribution liability (as distinct
from contractual contribution liability) involves all plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1145 (1982).
Termination liability involves only single employer and multiple employer plans. 29 U.S.C §
1361 (1982), as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-272, tit. xi, 100 Stat. 82, 237 (1986). Withdrawal
liability involves only multi-employer plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982). See PENSION AND WELFARE
BENEFITS, supra note 9.
[Vol. 5:7
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the claim and the basis for the claim.2 These include: (a) A pension
fund's claim for an employer's failure to comply with statutory mini-
mum-funding standards; (b) A pension fund's claim for an employer's
failure to comply with contractual funding obligations owing to the
fund; (c) The claim of a union or of employees for an employer's fail-
ure to comply with contribution obligations contained in a collective-
bargaining agreement or an employment agreement; (d) Statutory ex-
cise tax claims of the Internal Revenue Service for the tax liability
automatically imposed in the event of any accumulated funding defi-
ciency; (e) The claim of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC, the governmental agency implementing ERISA) for statutory
termination of an underfunded single-employer fund; (f) The claim of
the PBGC or of a union for statutory withdrawal of an employer from
an underfunded multi-employer fund (under the statutory program,
multi-employer funds include only plans established by a collective bar-
gaining agreement).
i. Pension Plan Minimum Funding Contribution Liability
Along with other health and welfare contributions, post-petition
pension contribution obligations are deemed administrative expenses
entitled to the first priority. Even where such contributions are mea-
sured by reference to time worked prior to bankruptcy, such payments
qualify in full as administrative expenses. The courts note that the obli-
gation accrued after the filing, that the hours worked pre-filing were
not consideration for the payment but only a measure and, finally, that
the payments are not due to employees but to the plan and, therefore,
€'r rN t r o rr l ra , 21
,J, l I IISJIt. ¥ I4dl.d
Pre-petition contribution obligations are "employee benefit plan
contributions," qualifying for the fourth priority. They do not qualify
as "wages" entitled to the third priority. 2
20. See Novikoff & Polebaum, supra note 9, at 405-06.
21. In re Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 713 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1983); Columbia Packing Co. v.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 81 Bankr. 205, 208-09 (D. Mass. 1988).
22. In re Shearon, 10 Bankr. 626 (D. Neb. 1981). Cf. Joint Indus. Bd. v. United States, 391
U.S. 224 (1968); United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959). See WARD &
NYHAN, Multi-Employer Benefit Fund Claims in Bankruptcy, in PENSION AND WELFARE BENE-
FITS IN BANKRUPTCY 1988, 44 P.L.I. COMM. at 182 [hereinafter WARD & NYHAN].
19891
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ii. Multi-employer Pension Plan Withdrawal Liability
ERISA imposes liability on employers withdrawing from union-
sponsored pension plans involving more than one employer (called
"multi-employer plans") for their pro rata share of unfunded vested
benefits.2" The Act further provides that in the event of dispute, the
amount of withdrawal liability is to be determined by arbitration. How-
ever, the courts are in dispute whether this statutory requirement is
applicable in the event of the employer's bankruptcy.24 Similarly, the
courts are in disagreement whether a withdrawal liability claim is enti-
tled to priority as an administrative expense. Some courts uphold such
a priority for the portion of the withdrawal liability attributable to
post-petition employment.25 Others reject such priority in toto.26
Pre-petition withdrawal liability is not entitled to any priority.
Since it does not involve a "contribution," it does not constitute an
"employment-benefit plan contribution" qualifying under the fourth
priority.2 7
iii. Single-Employer Pension Fund Termination Liability
Under ERISA, the PBGC guarantees the payment of certain
vested benefits28 in the event of the termination of a single-employer
plan with assets insufficient for the guaranteed benefits. 9 ERISA pro-
vides that in such event, the employer, as well as all members of a
group under common control of which the employer is a member, is
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1381(b) (1982).
24. Compare In re Hawley Coal Mining Corp., 5 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2680 (S.D.
W. Va. 1984) (arbitration mandatory) with In re T.D.M.A., Inc. 66 Bankr. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
(rejecting arbitration). See WARD & NYHAN, supra note 22, at 189.
25. E.g., In re Great N.E. Lumber & Millwork Corp., 7 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2236
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Cott Corp., 47 Bankr. 487 (D. Conn. 1984).
26. Trustees of Amalgamated Ins. Fund v. McFarlin's, 789 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1986); Amalga-
mated Ins. Fund v. Kessler, 55 Bankr: 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re United Dep't Stores, Inc., 49
Bankr. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
27. See Novikoff & Polebaum, supra note 9, at 414.
28. The PBGC guarantees the payment of vested pension benefits under most defined benefit
pension plans. It does not cover defined contribution plans. (Defined benefit programs reflect an
undertaking to provide pension payments in defined amounts. They are to be distinguished from
defined contribution plans, in which the undertaking is to make payments to individual accounts
according to a specified formula, but there is no undertaking as to the amount of the ultimate
benefits to be paid)
29. See HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 7, at 243-44. In the Single-Employer Pension Plan
Amendment Act of 1986, the Congress severely restricted the right of employers to terminate
such plans. Among other matters, the Act prohibits termination if it would violated the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. Pub. L. No. 99-272 § 11001-11019, 100 Stat. 82, 237 (1986).
[Vol. 5:7
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liable to the PBGC for the total amount of the unfunded benefit liabili-
ties to plan participants and beneficiaries.30 The priority status of the
PBGC termination liability claim is not clear. 31 One bankruptcy court
has held that the PBGC claim is not an administrative expense entitled
to the first priority, but rather, was analogous to a pre-petition tax
claim entitled to seventh-priority status.3 2 The PBGC has a secondary
claim where liability is limited by the 30 percent net worth limitation
to the difference between 75 percent of unfunded guaranteed benefits
and 30 percent of net worth.33 Unlike the primary claim, this claim is
not analogous to a tax lien and would, therefore, appear to be a general
unsecured claim without priority.
B. Disaffirmance of Collective Bargaining Agreements
The continued effectiveness of a pre-existing collective-bargaining
agreement after the bankruptcy of an employer which continues opera-
tions subsequent to the institution of reorganization proceedings
presents a major conflict between the objectives of the national labor
relations laws encouraging collective bargaining and the bankruptcy
laws seeking to conserve the debtor's assets. The conflict is not limited
merely to policy but extends to the express provisions in the statutes.
Section 365 of the Code authorizes the bankruptcy trustee, with
court approval, to reject any executory contract of the debtor. 34 On the
other hand, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)3 5 makes unilat-
eral rejection of a collective-bargaining agreement an unfair labor
practice and specifies an elaborate procedure for modification of an
agreement.3 6 The lower federal courts have disagreed on the standard
to determine the circumstances under which a bankruptcy court could
reject an unexpired collective-bargaining agreement binding the debtor
under § 365. Some decisions authorize rejection only where "neces-
sary" to prevent collapse of the debtor and immediate liquidation.3
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982 & Supp. 1988). The statute originally limited liability to the
lesser of the amount by which funded benefits exceeded available assets or 30 percent of the net
worth of the employer. When this limitation was deleted, the Act authorized the PBGC to accept
a 50 percent deferral of the liability for any year in which the person liable can show an absence
of pre-tax profits.
31. See Novikoff & Paulbaum, supra note 9, at 421, 437.
32. In re Bollinger Corp., No 76-282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1981).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b)(l)(A) (Supp. 1988).
34. II U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). See 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 5, at § 365.
35. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
37. See Railway, Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 167-69 (2d Cir.
1989]
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Other opinions utilize a standard more favorable to the debtor, approv-
ing rejection when supported by "a careful balancing of the equities on
both sides" even though not "necessary" to avoid liquidation. 8
In the Bildisco case,39 the Supreme Court by a vote of 5 to 4 en-
dorsed the less stringent balancing standard. It held that rejection re-
quired only a showing that the collective agreement "burdens" the
debtor's estate and that "after careful scrutiny, the equities balance in
favor" of rejection. In addition, the Court required a showing that the
employer had made reasonable efforts to renegotiate the agreement and
that such efforts "are not likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory
conclusion." 0
In permitting a unilateral modification of a collective-bargaining
agreement for the benefit of the employer in bankruptcy, the Court was
approving an action expressly forbidden by the national labor laws in
other situations. 1
The Congress promptly responded by enacting § 1113 of the Code,
restricting a debtor's ability to reject a collective agreement. 4 Section
1113 protects all provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement. It
has been held not to distinguish between mandatory and permissive
subjects of bargaining 43 and to protect retirees as well as employees. 4
Among other things, § 1113 provides for the following:
(1) It requires the debtor or its trustee to make a proposal to the
union based on the most recent information, providing "for those neces-
sary modifications in the employees' benefits and protections that are
necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and assuring that
all creditors, the debtor and all affected parties are treated fairly and
equitably." The proposal must be accompanied by "such relevant infor-
mation as is necessary to evaluate the proposal."
(2) The debtor or its trustee is required to meet with union repre-
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
38. E.g., NLRB v. Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), ajf'd, 465 U.S. 513 (1984); Local
Unions v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 702 F.2d 890 (11 th Cir. 1983); Shopmen's Local Union
No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Overseas Nat'l Airways,
238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (Bankruptcy Act).
39. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
40. Id. at 525-526.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). See In re Sol-Sief Produce Co., 17 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
145, 148 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
42. Pub. L. No. 98-353, tit. Ill, § 541(a), 98 Stat. 353, 390 (1984); 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp.
I1 1985). For references to the substantial literature, see supra note 7.
43. See HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 7, at 73-121.
44. In re Unimet Corp., Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 72,227 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 1988).
[Vol. 5:7
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sentatives "to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually sat-
isfactory modifications" of the agreement.
(3) To approve rejection, the court must find (i) that such a propo-
sal has been submitted; (ii) that the union has refused to accept it with-
out "good cause;" and (iii) that "the balance of the equities clearly
favors rejection." Section 1113 also specifies accelerated times for a
hearing and a decision.
Furthermore, § 1113(e) provides that during the period in which
the agreement continues in effect and after notice and hearing, the
court may authorize interim changes in an agreement in employee
wages, benefits and protections "if essential to the continuation of the
debtor's business, or in order to avoid irreparable damage to the
estate."
The full implications of § 1113 are far from clear. In Wheeling-
Pittsburgh,'5 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the
test of "necessary" in § 11 13(b) was more stringent than simply ena-
bling the debtor to cut labor costs. It read "necessary" in § 1 113(b) as
equivalent to "essential" in § 1 113(e)' 6 and held that the section was
concerned with the short-term objective of preventing liquidation,
rather than "the general long term viability of the Company.""' In Ca-
rey Transportation,'" and Royal Composing Room,'9 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit reached a contrary conclusion, holding
that modification need not be restricted to the "absolutely minimal"
and that the guiding objective was the long-term financial condition of
the debtor, rather than the short-term standard used in Wheeling-Pitts-
burgh.50 This conflict has not yet been resolved. In the meantime, the
threat of reorganization proceedings in bankruptcy and possible disaf-
45. Wheeiing-Pittsburgh Corp. v. Unitu Ste, 1,,,,,-,, .. ... . .. .  .0 ( (....
1986). See Comment, Bankruptcy Law - The Standard for Rejecting Collective Bargaining
Agreements in Bankruptcy: Labor Discovers It Ain't "Necessarily" So, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
79 (1988).
46. A number of bankruptcy courts have disagreed, construing "essential" in § 1113(e) as a
more demanding standard than "necessary" in § 1113(b). It has been held to require a more
immediate level of economic emergency. See In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 15 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) I (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 848 F. 2d 345 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Salt Creek
Freightways, 12 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 42 (D. Wyo. 1985); In re Russell Transfer, Inc., 12
Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 717 (W.D. Va. 1985).
47. 791 F.2d at 1089.
48. Truck Drivers Local 807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816 F.2d 82 (2d
Cir. 1987).
49. In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 848 F.2d 345, 348-49 (2d Cir. 1988).
50. 816 F.2d at 90. See In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 850 (E.D. Pa.
1978).
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firmance of the collective agreement is a new factor affecting the bal-
ance in labor relations.
C. Role of the Union in Bankruptcy
The role of the union in bankruptcy depends upon the nature of
the claim at issue. Where the union is a party to the establishment by
the employer of a pension plan or where a collective-bargaining agree-
ment with the union is involved, the union is a claimant in its own right
and has standing in the bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, a union may
resist an attempt to disaffirm a collective-bargaining agreement or may
assert a claim for unpaid pension contributions due under an agreement
to which it is a party, even where such contributions are payable to the
pension fund, not the union." Where, however, the union is not such a
participant or signatory, it is not a "creditor" and thus, lacks standing
to file a "claim" or participate in the proceedings. Even where recog-
nized as the exclusive-bargaining representative for purposes of the na-
tional labor relation laws, the union has no standing in the bankruptcy
court to assert its members' claims notwithstanding the labor-related
matters."2
There is even some question whether the workers covered by the
plan in question are entitled to participate in the proceedings, or
whether the trustees of the pension or benefit fund are the only ones
with standing. 3
Creditor's committees play an important role under the Code, par-
ticularly in the preparation of the reorganization plan in Chapter 11.
To qualify for appointment on the creditors' committee, the union must
establish that it is a "creditor" with a "claim," which in turn requires a
showing of a "right to payment."'" In situations wherein an employer's
51. In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 22 Bankr. 1001 (N.D. Tex. 1982); In re Schatze Fed. Bear-
ings Co., 5 Bankr. 543, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS, supra note 9
at 7, 29.
52. See In re Continental Airlines Corp., 64 Bankr. 874, 877-881 (S.D. Tex. 1986). Although
unions have successfully filed contribution claims on behalf of employees to require employers to
fulfill their funding obligations, these involve cases in which the obligations in question arose
under a collective bargaining agreement to which the union is a party. E.g., In re Shearon, 10
Bankr. 626 (D. Neb. 1981); In re Schatz Fed. Bearings Co., 5 Bankr. 543, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Similarly, although a union, as well as the PBGC, may assert a claim for employer liability for
withdrawal from a multi-employer plan, the employer's pension obligations in such cases again
arise under a collective bargaining agreement to which the union is a party.
53. In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 23 Bankr. 644 (D. Me. 1982). See PENSION & WELFARE
BENEFITS, supra note 9 at 30. The plan trustees have standing to assert the claim.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (Supp. I1 1985).
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pension obligation, although arising under a collective bargaining
agreement with the union, provides for payments to a pension fund, not
the union, there are theoretical difficulties in establishing the union's
"right to payment" as required by the statute. Moreover the union's
continued representation of employees, assuring their continued em-
ployment, may constitute a disqualifying conflict of interest in such
matters as whether creditors would be better served by reduction in the
workforce or by liquidation. Nevertheless, the appointment by the
bankruptcy court of a union representative to a Chapter 11 creditors'
committee has been approved. 55 However, the issue is still not entirely
free of doubt. 6
II. SALE OR MERGER
In cases where a union has been recognized as the bargaining rep-
resentative of the affected workforce, the sale or merger of a business
presents two major issues under the labor relations laws: (a) the extent
to which the labor laws limit the employer's managerial discretion in so
far as it affects workers; and (b) the obligations of a successor pur-
chaser or acquiring employer, including such matters as the extent to
which the purchaser or employer is bound by provisions of any collec-
tive bargaining agreement or obligated to bargain with the union.
A. Labor Obligations of the Seller
Most of the litigation in this area has involved the obligations of
the successor employer; there is only limited authority providing guid-
ance on the labor obligations of the seller. Thus, in First National
Maintenance the Supreme Court expressly reserved decision on
whether an employer must bargain over the sale or merger of a busi-
ness. 57 With respect to the sale of a plant, however, the National Labor
Relations Board [NLRB] ("the Board") has held that an employer
may unilaterally decide upon the sale of a plant-as distinct from its
relocation-without any obligation to bargain over the decision. 8 The
55. In re Altair Airlines, Inc., 727 F.2d 88, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1984). "
56. See HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 7, at 247-65.
57. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 n.22 (1981) (expressly
reserving such matters as "plant relocations, sales, subcontracting, automation" for future
decisions).
58. Local 864, UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972), enforcing, 191 N.L.R.B. 951
(1971). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has stated that "the board admits there is no
duty to bargain over the decision to sell the business." See Kirkwood Fabricators Inc. v. NLRB,
862 F.2d 1303, 1306 (8th Cir. 1988).
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employer is required to bargain only with respect to the effects of the
decision on the workers.5 9 Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit has held that an employer need not bargain with a union on a
decision to merge. 60 It should be noted, however, that this case arose
under the Railway Labor Act; hence, it is not clear whether this con-
struction of the allied statute also applies to the NLRA.61
B. Successor Liability: Labor Obligations of the Purchaser or Suc-
cessor of An Acquired Business
1. Successorship Liability Generally
For many purposes other than labor law, American law distin-
guishes sharply as a conceptual matter among various methods of ac-
complishing the sale, merger or other disposition of a business. In the
event of a sale of the shares of the corporation conducting the business,
the corporate employer continues without change of form with the
same assets and liabilities. Similarly, in the event of a statutory
merger, the surviving corporation succeeds to all the assets and as-
sumes all the liabilities of the merged corporation by operation of law.
However, in the event of a sale of assets and good will, the entity to
which the assets and good will are transferred typically is not subject to
the seller's obligation unless they are expressly assumed. While inroads
to the traditional doctrine have occurred in the area of torts and gener-
ally through the development of the "de facto" merger doctrine, the
traditional view still largely applies to contracts generally, including in-
dividual employment contracts.
59. Effects bargaining is required both in connection with partial closings, First Nat'l Mainte-
nance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) or complete closings. Kirkwood Fabricators Inc. v.
NLRB, 862 F.2d 1303, 1306 (8th Cir. 1988).
60. 45 U.S.C. § 151-164 (1982). The court reviewed the NLRA experience and apparently
treated the problems under the related statutes as comparable. Dist. 147 of the Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972). But see First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686
n. 23 (1981) (noting that the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act differ with respect to mandatory
subjects of bargaining).
61. The court even held that the employer need not bargain over the effects of the merger, but
there was no showing that the impact on employment or benefits of the workforce was signifi-
cantly affected by the merger. 473 F.2d at 557-60.
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2. Successor Liability under the Labor Laws
In contrast to the general law, a very different body of law has
developed in labor relations with respect to successor liability62 under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).68 The NLRB and the
courts have developed a functional standard reflecting economic reali-
ties, rather than legal forms or concepts, to determine when a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement or union representation continues in force
after a sale or merger, whatever the technical form through which
accomplished.
The Board has formulated a well-developed jurisprudence of "suc-
cessorship" to determine when a new entity acquiring a business or
utilizing the labor force, or equipment, or other elements of a predeces-
sor company becomes liable for labor obligations under a pre-existing
collective agreement or an obligation to bargain."' Under the labor
laws, successorship liability arises when there has been such continuity
in the workforce, in supervision, and in the processes of production that
there has been "substantial continuity of identity in the business
enterprise."65
In the application of the "continuity of identity" standard, the la-
bor laws sharply distinguish between transactions involving related par-
ties and those involving unrelated parties. Furthermore, reflecting fun-
damental concepts of contract and corporation law, the legal
consequences for labor relations purposes are affected to some degree
by the form in which the transaction is accomplished. The sale of stock
presents somewhat different issues than a transfer accomplished
through the sale of assets.
62. A comparable development has also occurred with respect to product liability claims, par-
ticularly where the original manufacturer has gone out of business. See P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW
OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUB-
STANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 13.05 (1987).
63. See supra notes I and 2, and accompanying text. The NLRA and its companion statute,
the Labor-Management Relations Act [LMRA], also known as the Taft-Hartley Act, comprise
the national labor relations laws governing collective bargaining agreements in the United States.
64. See generally GORMAN at ch. 24 (1979); DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 1129;
ANDERSON; Siebert & Webber, Joint Employer, Single Employer, and Alter Ego, 3 LABOR L.
873, 877-880 (1987); Note, Bargaining Obligations after Corporate Transformations, 54 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 624 (1979).
65. Cf. Fugazy Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1419 (2d Cir. 1984).
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a. Unrelated Purchaser
i. Sale of Stock
Where the transaction is accomplished through a sale of the stock
of the corporation conducting the business, corporation law and con-
tract law provide a preliminary answer. The legal identity as a juridical
person of the employer has not changed. Under traditional concepts, a
change of stock ownership accomplishes neither change in the entity
nor any release in and of itself, from the entity's contractual
obligations.66
Under the labor laws,67 these general rules of law resting on tradi-
tional conceptual analysis are only the starting point. They do not fi-
nally determine the labor obligations of the purchasing company. Al-
though the fact that the same entity is continuing is of some
importance, it may yield in special circumstances where the change in
stock ownership has resulted in a fundamental change in the employ-
ment relationship or continuity of the labor force and operations. In
such circumstances, labor law doctrines will prevail over the traditional
conceptual analysis, and the employer will no longer be obligated under
the pre-existing collective bargaining agreement.6 8
ii. Sale of Assets
Where there has been a sale of assets, the acquiring corporation is
a different legal entity, and it is not bound by the terms of the seller's
collective bargaining agreement. In Howard Johnson, the Supreme
Court refused to impose a duty to arbitrate upon the purchaser of the
assets and business of a unionized concern under the seller's collective
bargaining agreement where the purchaser hired only nine of the
seller's 53 employees. In the absence of significant continuity of the
workforce performing similar work, the employer was held not to be a
successor for labor law purposes even though it was continuing the pre-
vious business at the same location with the acquired assets. The Court
66. Miller Trucking Serv., Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 156 (1969), rev'd on other grounds 445 F.2d
927 (10th Cir. 1971).
67. Insofar as pension liabilities are concerned, however, the traditional doctrines appear still
to prevail. See Cummings, Labor and Employee Benefit Liabilities upon Transfer of Ownership,
in Southwestern Legal Foundation, 33 ANN. INST. LAB. L. DEV. § 11.03 (1987).
68. E.g., Spencer Foods, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1483 (1984), enforced in part, denied in part,
768 F.2d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985); TKB Int'l Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. 1082 (1979); MPE, Inc., 226
N.L.R.B. 519 (1976). See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 740-44; id at 269-70 (Supp.
1982-85).
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recognized the new employer's freedom to select the workforce and
lack of any continuing obligation under the prior labor agreement so
long as the employer was not motivated by anti-union considerations.69
However, if the continuity-of-identity standard is satisfied, the ac-
quiring corporation, even in transactions involving the purchase of as-
sets, may be required to bargain with the union previously recognized
as the exclusive bargaining representative for the workers affected,7" or
obligated to arbitrate under an arbitration provision in the predeces-
sor's collective agreement.7' The necessary continuity involves such
matters as the extent to which the new employer maintains the same
operations; uses the same plant; employs mostly the same workforce;72
maintains the same jobs under the same working conditions; employs
the same supervisors; uses the same machinery, equipment, and meth-
ods of production; or provides the same product or services. 73 The con-
tinued appropriateness of the bargaining unit or of any hiatus in opera-
tions must also be considered. Depending on the extent to which such
factors are present, the new employer may be required to bargain with
the previously recognized union. However, it will not be bound by the
prior collective-bargaining agreement. 7'
iii. Merger
Under traditional corporation law, the surviving corporation in a
merger by operation of law succeeds to all the assets and assumes all
the liabilities of the disappearing corporation.75 As in the case of a sale
69. See Silverstein, The Fate of Workers in Successor Firms: Does Law Tame the Market?, 8
INDUS. REL. L.J. 153, 171-172 (1986) [hereinafter Silverstein].
70. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 402 U.S. 27 (1987).
71. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
72. It is generally stated that the successor's obligation arises only when the old employees
constitute a majority of the workforce. See, e.g., I DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at
713-16. It is not entirely clear whether the majority in question relates to the predecessor
workforce or to the successor workforce. Compare Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Joint Exec. Bd.,
Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 263 (1974) (referring to predecessor employees in suit
on the contract under § 301) with NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv. Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281
(1972) (referring to successor employees in unfair labor practice proceeding)
. 
As suggested by
Professor Silverstein, the Supreme Court has held that a majority of the initial workforce that is
"substantial and representative" is sufficient, although less than a majority of the ultimate
workforce. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 107 S.Ct. 2225 (1987). See Silverstein,
supra note 68, at 163 n.42.
73. 1 DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 726 (1983).
74. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv's, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281 (1972); Howard Johnson
Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
75. See 15 W. Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7088, 7121
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of stock, this corporation law concept may yield to labor law doctrines.
In Wiley, the Supreme Court faced a merger in which the surviving
corporation integrated the approximately 40 employees of a unionized-
acquired corporation into its own 300-employee, non-union workforce.
The issue was whether under the arbitration clause agreement of the
acquired corporation's collective bargaining agreement, the surviving
corporation was obligated to arbitrate the extent to which the old
agreement applied to the retained employees. The Supreme Court held
that the acquiring corporation was bound to arbitrate, relying essen-
tially on the continuity of employment in substantially unchanged posi-
tions, rather than the form of the transaction.
iv. Other Successors
The Supreme Court decision in Burns involved the labor obliga-
tions of a firm that had replaced a unionized concern in providing se-
curity protection services for an industrial producer. The Supreme
Court held that the new concern was free to choose its own workforce
and to set the terms of employment without regard to the prior collec-
tive bargaining agreement or the union. However, when the new con-
cern had hired the former employees to perform essentially the same
work, the new concern was obligated to bargain with the union. This
duty arose because of the continuity of the workforce and of the em-
ployment relationship.
In cases involving acquisitions of businesses without continuity of
ownership such as was involved in Burns76 and Howard Johnson,77 the
Court appears to have imposed severe limits on the application of suc-
cessorship liability in order to encourage the mobility of capital and the
efficient functioning of the business-acquisition market.78
b. Related Purchasers
Where the new and old employers are interrelated and have sub-
stantially identical management and stock ownership as well as the
other continuity factors considered in connection with unrelated pur-
chasers - such as substantially identical business purposes, equipment
and customers - the two are regarded as alter egos of each other, or
essentially the same entity, for labor law purposes. The transaction is
(1983).
76. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 277-278 (1972).
77. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1973).
78. See Silverstein, supra note 68.
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deemed no more than a change of the form in which the same enter-
prise is being conducted; the new employer is termed no more than "a
disguised continuance of the old employer" and a "disguise intended to
evade" the labor laws.7 s In such cases, the "alter ego" employer is
bound by the existing agreement. 80 This "alter ego" doctrine is the ulti-
mate extension of successor liability.81
III. PLANT CLOSINGS, MASS LAYOFFS, AND PLANT RELOCATIONS
In recent years, plant closings and mass layoffs have become a
matter of sharply increased concern in the United States. A Bureau of
Labor Statistics survey found that over two million workers lost jobs
from plant closings from 1979 to 1984.8' Nevertheless, the restrictions
are still minimal on management decision-making in this area or the
imposition of employer liability for severance pay or other allowances
for affected workers. 88 Collective bargaining agreements which involve
unions sufficiently powerful to be able to include such provisions pro-
vide an exception. Other restrictions on management discretion arise
from two sources: national and state legislation, and collective bargain-
ing agreements with the labor relations laws governing such
agreements.
79. Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942).
80. E.g., Local 57, Int'l Ladies' Garment Wkrs.' Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967); NLRB v. Herman Bros. Pet Supply, Inc.,
325 F.2d 68, 70 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Ozark Hardwood Co., 282 F.2d 1, 7 (8th Cir. 1960).
81. There is a significant difference in the consequences of a successorship finding where there
has been no continuity of ownership and an alter ego finding. In the former, the successor is not
necessarily bound by the prior collective bargaining agreement. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security
Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972). A further finding must be made as to the appropriate-
ness of the bargaining unit before §s 8(a)(1) and (5) are violated. See South Prairie Const. Co. v.
Local No. 627, int'i Union of Operating Eng'rs, 425 U.S. 800, 803-05 (i976) (per curium);
NLRB v. Lantz, 607 F.2d 290, 297 (9th Cir. 1979). Under an alter ego finding, however, the
successor is regarded as the same employer, and the bargaining issue does not arise; the alter ego
is bound by the outstanding agreement. See NLRB v. Scott Printing Corp., 612 F.2d 783, 789-90
(3rd Cir. 1979) (Sloviter, J., dissenting); Slicker, A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of Employ-
ment Successorship - A Step Toward a Rational Approach, 57 MINN. L. REv. 1051, 1064 (1973);
Comment, Double-Breasted Operations in the Construction Industry: A Search for Concrete
Guidelines, 6 U. DAYTON L. REV. 45, 47 (1981).
The "alter ego" doctrine dealing with successorship in labor law is a very different concept
than the "alter ego" doctrine of "piercing the veil jurisprudence" in corporate law generally. See
P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW
PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 6.03 (1987);
P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPO-
RATIONS UNDER GENERAL STATUTORY AND REGULATORY LAW § 13.13 (1989).
82. See N.Y. Times, May 10, 1988, at A30, col. 3.
83. Affected workers receive normal unemployment compensation benefits.
19891
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
A. National and State Legislation
Although plant shutdowns and relocations have been an issue of
increasing concern on the American political scene, only the most lim-
ited federal and state legislation has thus far been enacted to deal with
the problem. Although powerful, the pressures to protect or restrict the
extent of injury to the workers and the communities affected by such
events have thus far been counterbalanced by an even stronger reluc-
tance to impose additional costs on business that would result in an
even less competitive national or state economy.
1. National Legislation
As a result of extensive shutdowns and plant relocations, particu-
larly in the Middle Western United States where such industries as
steel and automobiles have been affected, concern with the problem has
been a matter of considerable importance in national politics for more
than a decade."' A Census Bureau survey as analyzed by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics 5 discloses that in the period from 1979 to 1984 a total
of 11.5 million workers lost jobs because of shutdowns or relocations,
that nearly half those affected were employed in manufacturing indus-
tries,86 and that the affected areas were centralized in the Middle
West. Responding to such national concern, over President Reagan's
attempted veto, the Congress in the summer of 1988 overwhelmingly
enacted the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act. 7
The new statute includes provisions for advance notification of plant
closings and mass layoffs. Although the new law is widely applicable,
covering all American employers with 100 employees or more, its sub-
84. See generally Hansen, Layoffs, Plant Closings, Worker Displacement in America: Serious
Problems that Need a National Solution, 44 J. Soc. ISSUES 153 (1988) (hereinafter Hansen).
Thus, in 1973 and in subsequent sessions of Congress, there were proposals for a National
Employment Priorities Act dealing with, among other things, plant closings. The 1977 bill would
have required two years notice of a contemplated closing or transfer of all or part of an establish-
ment. H.R. 76, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
85. Hansen, REEMPLOYMENT INCREASES AMONG DISPLACED WORKERS (U.S. Dep't of Labor
Oct. 14, 1986); Hansen, ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER DISLOCATION IN A COMPETITIVE
SOCIETY (U.S. Dep't of Labor, Dec. 1986) (Report of the'Secretary of Labor's Task Force on
Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation). See also Hansen, supra note 83, at 155-56.
86. This is even more significant in view of the fact that manufacturing constitutes less than
20 percent of United States employment. Id. at 155. The survey also concludes that almost 50
percent of such displaced workers who lost jobs in manufacturing will be unable to find employ-
ment in their former industries, and most can expect to find only lower-paying jobs in service
industries. Id. at 157.
87. Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988).
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stantive provisions are minimal.
The law provides only that 60-day advance notice8" be given to
union representatives or, in the absence of a union, to workers, and to
state and local governmental officials when any permanent or tempo-
rary shutdown occurs, resulting in loss of employment for 50 people for
30 days or a mass layoff for six months for either one-third of the
workforce or 500 workers. The law imposes no restrictions on any kind
of managerial discretion with respect to such decisions and no employer
obligations of any kind with respect to severance pay or other worker
benefits. As a precatory matter, the law expresses the sense of the Con-
gress that even where not required to do so, employers "should, to the
extent possible, provide notice to its employees about a proposal to
close a plant or permanently reduce its workforce." '89 It also provides
for retraining and counseling for affected employees. Penalties for em-
ployer non-compliance are relatively modest, not exceeding 60 days
back pay for workers and $500 per day of violation for failure to notify
local officials, for a maximum of 60 days.
2. State Legislation
In contrast to the inaction of the federal government, approxi-
mately a dozen states, particularly in New England, have enacted stat-
utes dealing with plant closings and shutdowns. All are limited in their
scope,9" typically focusing on prior notice.91 Maine, Connecticut and
Massachusetts are three such states.
a. Maine
The Maine statute enacted in 1979 applies in cases of the termina-
tion (defined as a "substantial cessation") of operations or a relocation
of "all or substantially all" operations to a new 'ocation more than 100
miles distant, whether inside or outside of Maine. It imposes upon em-
ployers the obligation to pay severance pay equal to one week's pay for
each year of employment to each affected worker employed for three
years or more. In addition, employers are required to give 60 days' no-
88. The law contains liberal reductions of the notification period in cases where notice would
impede an employer's efforts to obtain additional capital or business or of unforeseeable circum-
stances. H.R. No. 3 100th Cong. 2d Sess. § 6403(b).
89. Id. at §§ 6403, 6407.
90. Hansen concludes that most of the legislation is considered "ineffective." Hansen, supra
note 83, at 162.
91. See M. Shershin, Plant Closings: Recent Developments, in THIRD ANNUAL LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW INSTITUTE 31, 42 (1987).
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tice to the state, the local municipal government and to workers of the
proposal in order to relocate or terminate.9 2
b. Connecticut
The Connecticut statute enacted in 1983 provides only for em-
ployer payment of group health insurance premiums for 90 (subse-
quently increased to 120) days for employees affected by a permanent
plant closing or relocation of operations to a location outside Connecti-
cut. It contains no provisions for prior notice of the decision or sever-
ance pay.93
c. Massachusetts
The Massachusetts statute enacted in 1984 provides for reemploy-
ment assistance, including counseling and training, and continuation of
health insurance. It also contains a provision for voluntary advance no-
tification by employers as well as some incentives encouraging employ-
ers to provide such notice. 94
Thus, it is apparent that notwithstanding the extensive political
debate, the American legislative response to the problem has thus far
been insignificant. Widespread recognition of the hardship imposed on
workers and on communities, particularly where the employer has been
a principal employer in the area, has thus far not outweighed the con-
cern that imposition of restrictions on employers would render the ju-
risdiction less competitive, encourage loss of existing enterprise, dis-
courage new enterprise and thus ultimately lead to lower levels of
economic activity and employment. On the state level, there is a con-
cern with becoming less competitive with other states. More recently,
the country as a whole has become concerned with its relative competi-
tive position with other nations.
B. Collective Bargaining and the National Labor Relations Laws
With statutory protection so limited, union strength, such as it is,
represents the only realistic source of worker protection against plant
92. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 625-B (1988). See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1 (1987) (upholding constitutionality).
The Act applies to establishments employing 100 workers or more. It excludes relocation or
termination "necessitated by a physical calamity" and employees covered by a contract containing
severance pay provisions or accepting employment at the new location.
93. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-51n, 31-51o (1987 & Supp. 1988).
94. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151A, §71A (West Supp. 1988).
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closings and mass layoffs. 98 This arises on two levels. In those cases
where unions have been recognized as the exclusive-bargaining repre-
sentative of the workforce,96 the national labor relations laws as con-
strued by the NLRB and the courts impose significant restrictions on
employer decision-making in this area,"' requiring collective bargaining
over certain decisions and over the effects of other decisions. In addi-
tion to the obligation to bargain, in those cases where bargaining has
previously resulted in a collective-bargaining agreement, the terms of
the agreement may deal expressly with such matters or their
consequence.
1. National Labor Relations Act
The application of the national labor relations laws mainly reflects
an adherence to the desirability of laissez-faire economics and a reli-
ance on the marketplace to impose controls on managerial decisions
with respect to major changes in the conduct of a business.9 8 The
courts are firm in protecting unilateral management decision-making in
those areas regarded as the "core of entrepreneurial control" that in-
volve economic profitability apart from the employment relationship.
This "core" concerns "[D]ecisions concerning the commitment of in-
vestment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise.""
a. Closing or Relocation
Consistent with such principles, the Supreme Court has held that
an employer may unilaterally decide to close its entire business for any
reason, including anti-union animus.'00
In First National Maintenance, the Court more recently held that
an employer may unilaterally decide to close parl of its business so long
95. See generally, P., S., & T. Munger, Plant Closures and Relocations Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 5 GA. ST. UNIv. L. REV. 77 (1988).
96. The National Labor Relations Act, among other things, provides for the right of workers
to organize into unions, specifies the procedure for designation of a union as the exclusive bargain-
ing unit, and requires the employer to bargain with such union. See 29 U.S.C. §§157-59 (1982).
97. Professor Silverstein has noted that a few state statutes impose more stringent obligations
in these areas upon those employers not subject to the NLRA. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1127
(West Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149 § 179C (West 1982). See Silverstein, supra
note 68, at 156 n.14.
98. See Silverstein, supra note 68, at 157-74.
99. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
100. Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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as the motivation is economic. 1 ' The Act neither requires any prior
notice of the decision, nor bargaining with respect to it. The employer
is lawfully free to reach it without union participation or consultation
of any kind.
The standard applied to such unilateral employer determinations is
whether the employer decision to relocate or close a part of the busi-
ness is related to overall considerations such as a "fundamental change
in the nature or direction of the business." In such cases, the employer
has no obligation to bargain over the decision; however, if it reflects
anti-union motivation, 02 the employer action clearly constitutes an un-
fair labor practice. Furthermore, the Board for many years also con-
cluded that if the decision turned on labor costs, an employer's refusal
to bargain was an unfair labor practice. In other words, the crucial
factor for the Board is whether the decision is motivated by economic
considerations, on the one hand, or labor-related considerations on the
other. If it is reflecting a "change in the nature or direction of the
business" and including a response to a new technology, the employer
is free to proceed unilaterally. However, in a recent decision, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit challenged the Board's approach,
holding that in the absence of anti-union animus, an employer's deci-
sion to close one of its plants based on increasing production costs in-
cluding labor costs was not subject to mandatory bargaining under the
Act.103
Also consistent with the philosophy to protect unilateral manage-
ment decision-making regarding economic profitability, the Board has
held that an employer had no duty to bargain with the union over a
decision to discontinue a research and development activity at a New
Jersey plant and transfer it to a Connecticut plant.'04
Although the employer may be free to decide such issues unilater-
ally, the labor relations laws impose certain minimum requirements on
employers in plants with a union recognized as the exclusive bargaining
representative. In such cases, the employer must bargain with the union
with respect to the economic effects of the decision on the workers af-
101. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
102. Textile Wkrs. Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3)
(1988).
103. Arrow Automotive Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1988).
104. Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984). The employer contended that the functions
of the two plants overlapped, that the New Jersey facility was outdated, and that technological
advances would be advanced by consolidation at the newer and larger Connecticut research
center. See I DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 63, at 293 (Supp. 1982-85).
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fected, both in the case of a partial closing '08 and in the case of a
closing of the entire business.1"6 This doctrine even applies when the
decision in question has been made by a bankruptcy trustee.' 7
These requirements relate exclusively to procedures after the em-
ployer has made its decision. They do not in any way restrict the deci-
sion-making discretion of management or impose any substantive obli-
gations in the event of a managerial decision resulting in shutdown or
layoff'0 8 (in the absence of relevant provisions in an applicable collec-
tive bargaining agreement). 0 9
b. Subcontracting
Decisions with respect to the subcontracting of industrial opera-
tions also present difficult issues. Subcontracting has been held to re-
quire mandatory bargaining in cases where it has a direct impact on
the workforce, such as where the decision turns on labor costs or where
employment or overtime is affected;" 0 however where subcontracting
reflects a decision concerning the scope of business, as when an em-
ployer is faced with a heavy increase in orders, there is no bargaining
requirement."'
2. Collective Bargaining Agreements
Collective bargaining agreements may provide further protection
to covered workers with respect to plant closings, mass layoffs and
plant relocations. Depending on the relative strength of the employer
and the union in the industry in question, the collective bargaining
agreement may deal with such matters, restrict employer decision-mak-
ing, or provide for union participation or consultation in such decisions.
At best, however, the protection provided by the terms of such collec-
tive agreements is spotty and limited.
105. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). Under American law, the
employer must bargain in good faith until negotiations reach an impasse. There is no obligation to
conclude an agreement.
106. Kirkwood Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 1303 (8th Cir. 1988).
107. Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F. 2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984)
(complete termination of operations).
108. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
109. If the agreement imposes limitations on the employer, a failure to comply with such
provisions constitutes an unfair labor practice under § 8(b) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
(1982). It is also a breach of contract enforceable under § 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
110. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
111. Ausable Communications, 273 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1985).
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A older survey cited in a Columbia Law Review article disclosed
that only about 21.5 percent of all the collective-bargaining agreements
studied contained some restriction of management's right to close or
relocate a plant; another older study found that only about 25 per-
cent of agreements contained provisions dealing with subcontracting."'
In contrast, most recent American agreements contain provisions pre-
serving the right to decide such matters as mergers, plant relocations
and shutdowns." 4
Even where collective bargaining agreements do not deal directly
with such matters, the labor arbitration process may result in limita-
tions on managerial discretion. Arbitrators may find implied obligations
that regulate managerial discretion in these areas and require a demon-
stration of employer "good faith" or "fair dealing;" some rational basis
for the management decision must be evident, relating to efficiency of
operations and reflecting a concern for employee interests and
expectations.
CONCLUSION
Neither the national labor relation laws nor other statutes, federal
or state, assure unions or workers a right of participation in major deci-
sions that affect the enterprise, in spite of their dramatic impact on the
workforce."' Nor do such statutes generally impose any significant em-
ployer obligations by way of notice or severance pay or other benefits
that might offset in some degree the shock of such developments on the
affected workers. Employers are largely free to reach such decisions
without labor participation.
With statutory protection so limited, where there is no union rep-
resentation workers are substantially without voice or protection in
these matters. Although labor unions represent the only effective pro-
tection for workers, they still have had only moderate impact in this
112. See Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work. The Search for
Standards in Defining the Scope of the Duty to Bargain, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 803, 821-22 (1971).
113. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 212 n.7 (1964).
114. See F. BAERWALD, ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS OF LABOR 359-60 (2d ed. 1970)
(quoting 1966 United States Labor Department survey showing that 860 of 1,773 collective bar-
gaining agreements surveyed contained management control provisions).
115. Professor Silverstein points out: "there is nothing in the NLRA or its legislative history
to suggest that Congress intended to redefine property rights to the extent necessary for labor to
share authority over decisions involving the scope or nature of the enterprise." She contrasts this
experience with other statutes, which she describes as "social" legislation, such as ERISA and the
railroad transportation statutes, in which the federal government acts as a guarantor of the eco-
nomic interests of labor. See Silverstein, supra note 68, at 175.
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area.
Depending on their relative economic strength, some unions have
been able to restrict employer discretion by including provisions in the
collective bargaining agreement dealing with job security. These may
restrict the employer's decision or the manner of reaching the decision
or the consequences of the decision. Moreover, where a union has been
designated as the bargaining representative, the labor relations laws re-
quire employers to bargain with employees over the effects of such
decisions.
The significance of even such restricted labor protection is under-
mined by the diminishing strength of the American labor movement.
Collective bargaining agreements in the United States cover only a
small minority of the workforce. In 1985, union membership included
only about 17 million persons, which is approximately 17 percent of the
employed civilian workforce. Moreover, if national, state, and local
government employees are excluded (since they are almost never in-
volved in such problems as plant shutdowns and relocations), collective
agreement coverage amounts to only 11 million members, merely 13
percent of the non-governmental workforce.116
Although this number is relatively small, it is somewhat more sig-
nificant than it appears. Service employees are less affected by plant
shutdowns and relocations, and might well be excluded. In addition,
collective-bargaining agreements as well as union representation benefit
non-union workers and union members alike in the plants in question.
Even after such adjustments, however, it is apparent that only a rela-
tively small portion of the national workforce has the protection of
union representation. Thus, the great majority of American workers
would appear fundamentally unprotected in this area.
The surprising growth of employee stock ownership plans provides
one hopeful note. Employee acquisition of distressed plants as an alter-
native to shutdown has become a not uncommon response to such em-
ployer decisions in both solvent and insolvent firms. Such programs pre-
serve employment at least for some period. At the same time, they
typically involve employee acceptance of substantial reductions in wage
levels by the workforce in an effort to enable the plant to compete more
effectively. The extent and experience of employee acquisitions to date
is both limited and mixed, and it is too early to conclude whether this
alternative represents an effective solution to the problem.
116. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Tables Nos. 661, 672, 693 (1987).
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The United States is firmly committed to a market economy. Al-
though there is sharply increased political tension between the protec-
tion of workers and the impact of market forces on employers, the
traditional structure of industry is substantially unchanged. American
labor relations continue in their unique pattern. Employee protection
- where it exists at all - is found almost entirely in collective-bar-
gaining agreements and union representation, rather than in statute or
administrative regulation."1 7
117. See Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 1394 (1971); D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 208-14 (1970).
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Appendix A
PROPOSED STUDY ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS' RIGHTS IN THE
EVENT OF INSOLVENCY AND BUSINESS REORGANIZATION
A. Insolvency
1. Definitions of insolvency, as applied to corporate bodies, individuals
and other legal persons.
The American bankruptcy law has two definitions of insolvency:
"equity" insolvency and "bankruptcy" insolvency. For purposes of de-
termining when an involuntary bankruptcy petition may be dismissed,
the Bankruptcy Code utilizes the "equity" standard, requiring proof
that "the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such
debts become due . . ,"" For other purposes, the Code utilizes the
"bankruptcy" standard defined in § 101(31) as a situation wherein the
sum of an entity's "debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at
a fair valuation."' 9
a. What categories of insolvency are known in your legal system?
In numerous areas of the law, the occurrence or existence of insol-
vency gives rise to the application of legal doctrines for the protection
of creditors. For example, the state corporation laws uniformly prohibit
further corporate distributions to shareholders. The fraudulent convey-
ance laws generally prohibit transfers of the insolvent's assets except in
exchange for "reasonably equivalent value" or "fair consideration" as-
sets. State insolvency laws provide for procedures for the administra-
tion of the insolvent's affairs.
The balruptcy laws pcrmit a creditor to institute involuntary pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy. Such proceedings, however, may be dismissed
118. I1 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (Supp. III 1985). The "equity" test of insolvency has been used by
American equity jurisprudence for many years. The predecessor bankruptcy statute employed the
so-called "bankruptcy" of balance-sheet text of insolvency, requiring an excess of liabilities over
assets. 11 U.S.C. §1(19) (1976) (repealed). The substitution of the equity insolvency test for the
bankruptcy test for this purpose was a change of great significance. See H. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 324 (1978); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1978).
119. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (Supp. II1 1985). "Fair valuation" has been construed to mean fair
market value, or the value that may be realized in a reasonable period of time by a willing seller,
rather than forced sale or book value. See P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS:
PROBLEMS IN THE BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORA-
TIONS, INCLUDING THE LAW OF CORPORATE GUARANTIES, § 7.06 (1985); McCoid, The Occasion
for Involuntary Bankruptcy, 61 AM J. BANKR. L. 195 (1987).
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in the absence of equity insolvency. The debtor itself, even though still
solvent, may institute voluntary proceedings in bankruptcy where un-
dertaken in good faith. Such federal bankruptcy proceedings may con-
template either liquidation (Chapter 7) or corporate reorganization
(Chapter 11).
In the event of insolvency, proceedings may also be instituted
under equity jurisprudence or state insolvency laws leading to the ap-
pointment of a receiver. However, if federal bankruptcy proceedings
are instituted, they automatically preempt many state proceedings.
The federal bankruptcy proceedings may contemplate either liqui-
dation (Chapter 7) or reorganization (Chapter 11) in the case of
corporations.
b. What measures are there (e.g. receivership in English law) that
have as their objective the protection of secured creditors in the event
of the debtor's insolvency?
The appointment of a receiver to administer property and prevent
waste, or to realize on collateral for a secured creditor is an established
feature of American equity jurisprudence. a20 Receivers also continue to
play a role in state insolvency law in connection with the administration
of an insolvent's estate.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, state insolvency proceedings are au-
tomatically stayed with the institution of voluntary or involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings in a federal court"21 and the federal court ac-
quires jurisdiction, notwithstanding the existence of a state receiver ap-
pointed under a state insolvency law. 22 Further, the bankruptcy trustee
can avoid any lien imposed in favor of a state insolvency receiver 23 and
require a state receiver to turn over to the trustee any debtor property
being administered by it.' 4
The Code expressly forbids the appointment of a receiver in a
bankruptcy case. 2 This reflects the view that the provisions of the
Code that provide for the appointment of trustees for bankrupt estates
eliminate any need for receivers.126 Thus, the Code also provides for the
120. 2 Story, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §1145 (14th ed. Lyon, 1918); KERR, LAW AND PRAC-
TICE AS TO RECEIVERS 26-27 (14th ed. Walton, 1972).
121. It U.S.C. § 303(h) (Supp. III 1985).
122. In re Sun World Broadcasters, Inc., 5 Bankr. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 545 (Supp. 111 1985).
124. II U.S.C. §§ 101(10)(A),(C), 542 (Supp. II 1985).
125. II U.S.C. § 105(b) (Supp. 111 1985).
126. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 316 (1978); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th
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appointment of an interim trustee at the outset of a liquidation pro-
ceeding with a function described at the time of adoption as "similar to
that of a receiver under current law."'12 7 However, notwithstanding this
provision, federal courts under their equitable powers may still appoint
receivers to perform limited functions with respect to an asset of the
bankrupt's estate, provided these actions are not inconsistent with the
trustee's general responsibilities in administering the estate.'28
Receiverships also survive in connection with civil enforcement
proceedings under such federal statutes as those concerned with securi-
ties law' 9 or small business investments. 30
2. Give an indication of the pattern and incidence of insolvency
within your legal system in recent years. This account should include
statistical information on the size and type of businesses most affected,
and information on important legal developments that have taken place
in this period.
See Appendix B.
3. Protection of workers' rights in insolvency.
a. What effect does insolvency have on the continuation of the indi-
vidual employment relationship, that is, the contract of employment?
Under § 365 of the Code, the trustee, with court approval, may
disaffirm any executory contract, including an individual employment
contract. 31 Section 1113 limiting the application of § 365 in labor mat-
ters applies only to collective bargaining agreements. 32
b. What priority, if any, do employees of an insolvent employer have
over other creditors (secured and unsecured) for the payment of wages
due, holiday pay, notice pay and other employment rights?
There is no priority of any kind over secured creditors. For priori-
ties of employees over general unsecured creditors in the distribution or
allocation of assets available for unsecured creditors, see supra sec. I-
Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1978).
127. Id at 102.
128. In re Memorial Estates, Inc., 797 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1986).
129. See e.g., SEC v. First Fin. Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429, 439-40 (5th Cir. 1981); SEC
v. Lincoln Thrift Ass'n., 577 F.2d 600, 605-08 (9th Cir. 1978).
130. E.g., United States v. Royal Bus. Funds Corp., 724 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1983).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (Supp. II1 1985).
132. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. I1 1985).
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Al (Statutory Priorities).
c. Is such a priority unqualified, or is it subject to financial (or other)
limitations?
The priority serves only to determine the order of distribution of
those assets of the bankrupt available for distribution (or allocation in
a reorganization plan) to general unsecured creditors.
4. Collective rights.
a. What is the effect of insolvency on existing collective agreements?
See supra sec. I-B (Disaffirmance of Collective Bargaining
Agreements).
b. Do trade unions representing workers in the insolvent undertaking
have any part to play in the legal insolvency procedures?
Trade unions have standing to participate only with respect to
matters for which they are "creditors." To have standing, the claim
must arise under a collective bargaining agreement or plan to which
the union is a party or under an unpaid pension plan or benefit plan.
The union has no standing to assert claims on behalf of its members.
See supra sec. I-C (Role of the Union in Bankruptcy).
5. What protection, if any is accorded to persons who have loaned
money to the insolvent employer in order to cover the payment of
wages or other employment-related expenses?
Section 507(d) of the Code expressly denies any priority for per-
sons with subrogated claims, including wages and pension plan contri-
butions qualifying for third and fourth priorities under the statute.13
6. Protection by the state for the employees of insolvent undertakings.
a. In the event of the employer being unable to meet employment-
related claims made by workers or trade unions, what provision does
the state make to ensure payment is forthcoming?
Pension contributions aside, there are no provisions of this kind
under American law, except with regard to amounts withheld from
payments of employees' wages for remittance to the Internal Revenue
Service for application against the wage-earners' income taxes. With
133. I1 U.S.C. § 507(d) (Supp. III 1985).
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respect to pensions, ERISA13 " provides for a federal corporation, and
PBGC guarantees vested pension obligations under defined benefit
plans. 135 The PBGC is financed by employer payments supplemented
by governmental funding. See supra sec. I-A2(c)(3) (Single-Employer
Pension Fund Termination Liability).
Two states, New York and Wisconsin impose liability on corporate
shareholders for a corporate employer's unpaid wages.13  A number of
states, including Illinois and Pennsylvania, make non-payment of wages
a minor criminal offense on the part of the corporate officers
involved." 7
b. Is there a state-guaranteed fund to which employees can have re-
course? Where such a fund exists, how is it financed?
See preceding answer.
7. Pensions and Social Security.
a. To what extent are the entitlements of employees to pension and
Social Security benefits protected when their employer becomes
insolvent?
For pension benefits, see the response to question A-6a, supra. So-
cial Security benefits are paid directly by a governmental agency. They
are financed by taxes imposed on employers and employees, but the
payment of benefits is not affected by an employer's insolvency, except
to the very limited extent to which the total amount of the benefits is
affected by the employer'IS el inquency with respect to tax payments
currently due.
134. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq. (1982). See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
135. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation [PBGC], a federal agency, assures payment
of such pensions to covered workers. In case of most defined benefit plans, delinquent employers,
and their controlling shareholders, are liable to the PBGC for pension funding deficiencies in the
event of termination of a plan up to a maximum of 30 percent of their net worth. Employees are
also liable for the pro rata share of the unfunded vested employee benefits on withdrawal from a
multi-employer plan.
136. N.Y Bus. Corp. L. § 630 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1988); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.40(6)
(West 1957).
137. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 5-4 (Smith-Hurd 1977); 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 307 (Purdon 1973).
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B. Business Reorganization
1. What are the principal means recognized for the transfer of under-
takings in your legal system?
The American legal system provides for an extensive number of
techniques to accomplish transfer of a business or elements thereof.
This may be accomplished by sale or exchange of stock, sale of assets,
merger, and, in special cases, through franchises, licenses or leases.
a. Is it important for legal reasons to distinguish between acquisition
of control by share purchase and acquisition by purchase of the assets
of an undertaking?
Under American law, there are dramatically different conceptual
treatments of a transfer of shares, involving no change in the juridical
person owning and conducting the enterprise, and a transfer of the con-
stituent assets of an enterprise. The form of the transaction plays an
important role in determining the legal consequences of the transfer. In
labor relations, however, this is only the starting point in the analysis,
and the normal conceptual consequences may, in selected cases, yield to
more urgent considerations of the national labor relations law. See
supra sec. III-B2 (Collective Bargaining Agreements).
b. What in practice are the most common forms of transfer?
When one corporation acquires a business or when two corpora-
tions combine, the precise form in which the transfer or combination is
accomplished reflects an exquisite calculus involving a sensitive balanc-
ing of critical elements arising under the tax laws (under which certain
forms are not subject to taxes and may preserve tax loss and tax credit
carrybacks and carryovers), the corporate law (with respect to approval
by shareholders and the right of dissenting shareholders to demand
payment in cash), the securities law (with respect to solicitations of
approval from shareholders and the registration of new securities where
involved in the transaction), and the common law (with respect to such
matters as exposure to liabilities and possible non-assignability of li-
censes, contracts, and the like where such matters are of business
importance).
Transfers are frequently accomplished through mergers-often the
merger of the acquired company into a subsidiary of the acquiring
company. Transfers through acquisition or exchange of shares of stock
or of assets, however, are also common. There is no particular form
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that may be termed predominant.
2. Indicate the consequences which transfer has on the workers'
rights.
Is provision made by law for the automatic continuation of the
contract of employment (and associated rights), or for the transfer of
rights guaranteed by collective agreements?
See supra sec. II (Sale or Merger).
-3. What specific protections does the state envisage for workers'
rights in the event of transfer?
Taking the EEC Directive on Transfer of Undertakings (OJ 1977
L61/26) as a guide, to what extent in theory and practice are its con-
tents reflected in the rules of your legal system?
Except in the case of certain regulated industries, particularly in
the transportation field, American law makes no provision whatsoever
for the protection of individual workers' rights in the event of transfer.
Contractual obligations may bind the transferee under common law
principles or under corporate law principles governing formal and "de
facto" mergers.
The picture is quite different with respect to collective bargaining
agreements. The labor relations laws have an elaborate body of law
which provides limited protection for workers with respect to the im-
pact of transfers upon collective bargaining agreements and a union's
right to negotiate as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
workforce of a bargaining unit. See supra sec. II-B (Successor Liabil-
ity: Labor Obligations of the Purchaser or Successor of An Acquired
4. Where a business is reorganized to take account of changed needs
(e.g. the introduction of new technology, or new working patterns),
what protection is given to workers who are required to work under
new conditions?
American law provides no protection for individual workers. The
labor relations laws, however, provide a measure of protection insofar
as workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement or represented
by a union qualifying as the exclusive bargaining agent are concerned.
In such cases, an employer's changes in operations or their structure,
including changes resulting from new technology or new working pat-
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terns, are mandatory subjects of bargaining. 18 Either failure to bar-
gain or a unilateral change constitutes an unfair labor practice.1"9
Where the response to new technology takes the form of work sub-
contracting or a partial closing, a different standard may apply. See
supra sec. III-B (Collective Bargaining and the National Labor Rela-
tions Laws).
C. Reform
1. In the light of the above survey of practice, what changes do you see
as desirable within your legal system in order to make better provision
for the protection of workers' rights in the event of insolvency and busi-
ness reorganization?
One much discussed area is the desirability of increased protection
of workers and affected communities from the consequences of plant
shutdowns and relocation. This is emerging as one of the leading politi-
cal issues on the American labor agenda.
Another important area of labor concern is the wide power of the
bankruptcy court, even after the enactment of § 1135 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to disaffirm a collective bargaining agreement. Some
courts have construed the statute to permit disaffirmance even though
not required for the short-term survival of the firm. This interpretation
represents a subordination of worker interests to improvement of the
earning power of the firm in order to improve the position of creditors
generally. Accordingly, it represents a choice of political values that is
highly unpalatable from the labor point of view.
Yet a third area of labor concern is further encouragement of em-
ployee stock ownership as an alternative, thus permitting the.employer
to dispose of an operation while making it possible for workers to con-
tinue the business and maintain employment.
138. E.g., NLRB v. Columbia Trib. Pub., 495 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1974), enforcing, 201
N.L.R.B. 538 (1973); Technicolor Government Servs., Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. No. 187, 117 LRRM
1103 (1984); See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 817-20; id. at 290 (Supp.
1982-85).
139. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 159(a) (1982) ("conditions of employment").
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Appendix B
Statistical Abstract of the United States (1987)
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